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This paper analyses preference erosion effects on the agricultural sector of the EU’s 
Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) with the partial equilibrium multi-commodity 
multi-region world trade model AGRISIM. Supposing that the preferences to the MPCs 
granted by the EU remain as of 2001 then the effects are evident for high protected 
markets like beef in Turkey, milk and rice in Morocco and olive oil in the MPCs. Sup-
posing a free trade area between the EU and the MPCs, then the impacts are high for 
beef, milk and sugar. The farmers’ income decreases, but the consumers and the tax-
payers benefit from lower prices and the overall welfare in all MPCs increases. 
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  Parallel  to  ongoing  discussions  on  multilateral  liberalisation,  Preferential  Trade 
Agreements (PTAs) have been widely spread in recent years. By July 2007 a total of 
380 regional PTAs have been notified to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), with 
Free Trade Areas (FTAs) and partial scope PTAs accounting for 90 % and customs un-
ions for nearly 10 % (WTO, 2007). The expansion of the PTAs can be seen as a possi-
ble reason for the standstill of the current WTO negotiations, since opening to a multi-
lateral system results in erosion of preferences enjoyed under bilateralism. 
  The most significant PTAs within the Mediterranean basin are the Euro-Med Agree-
ments and are among the EU and ten east and southern Mediterranean Countries. The 
Agreements were established in 1995, in the Summit of Barcelona and aim to form a 
Free  Trade  Area  between  the  Mediterranean  Partner  Countries  (MPCs)  after  2010, 
which should be accompanied by economic and financial cooperation. Signatory coun-
tries of the Barcelona Declaration are the EU-15, Cyprus and Malta, which are already 
Member States of the EU, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, the Pales-
tinian Authorities and Turkey, while Libya is not yet a partner country but an observer 
(EU Commission, 2008). The Euro-Med Agreements have not evolved as wished and 
this is mainly attributed to the slow progress of the negotiations concerning the agricul-
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tural sector. 
  The Mediterranean countries have shown a strong interest in participating in the cur-
rently discussed multilateral trading system, as most of them are already members of the 
WTO  or  have  applied  for  membership  (WTO  notifications,  2008).  Garcia  Álvarez-
Coque (2006) notes that all the MPCs have moved towards implementing the Agree-
ment on Agriculture and have committed themselves to reducing export subsidies, do-
mestic support and import duties on agricultural products. Although they are intersected 
into different interest groups during the Doha negotiations, they all ask for a special 
treatment of their agricultural sector and they want to preserve at least up to a certain 
grade the preferential treatment they currently enjoy, fearing the effects of preference 
erosion (Garcia Álvarez-Coque, 2006). 
  Within this framework, objective of this paper is to discuss the issue of preference 
erosion and to analyse empirically the impacts of multilateral liberalisation on the agri-
cultural markets of the MPCs. For this purpose the paper is organised in six sections. 
After the introduction follows the second section, where the preferential regime the 
MPCs enjoy under the Euro-Med Agreements is described. On the third section follows 
a literature review of relevant studies. On the fourth section is presented the empirical 
model which is used for this study, while the results are presented on the fifth part. Fi-
nally the paper closes with concluding remarks on the sixth and last section. 
 
 
Trade preferences to Agricultural Commodities within the Euro-Med Agreements 
  An  indication  of  the  evolution  of  trade  preferences  in  the  Mediterranean  basin 
granted by the involved countries in this agreement can be given by the value of the 
preference margin (VPM). Grethe et al. (2006) argue that the VPM of all agricultural 
commodities for all MPCs covered by the agreements of the mid-70s was about €130 
million, whereas in 1995 the VPM was about €190 million (an increase of 48%) and 
after the Barcelona Agreement this reduced to about €165 million. According to the au-
thors this negative change is attributed to the reduced EU MFN tariffs (Most Favourite 
Nation). They argue that once all Euro-Med Agreements have entered into force the 
VPM will reach €226 million. 
  Tables 1 and 2 present in detail the VPM from imports into the EU of selected agri-
cultural commodities for the period 1998-2003. The calculations were done following 
Grethe and Tangermann (1998) i.e. it has been assumed that both the preferential and 
the non-preferential commodities are sold in the destination market (which is in this 
case the EU) at the same price and thus the value of the preference margin is the price 
difference between preferential and non-preferential exports multiplied by the quantity 
of the commodity each partner country exported into the EU. In most of the cases the 
MFN duties are the applied ones and thus the VPM is zero. The MPCs gain due to the 
preferential treatment only for their main export products such as fruits and vegetables. 
The size of the VPM for a given commodity differs significantly from country to coun-
try. This is mainly because of the high variation in exported quantities and not because 
of any variation in the preferential duty compared to the MFN one. The difference 
though between the MFN and the applied duty varies between 0.2 and 7 %. A compari-
son of the VPM of 2003 with that of 1999 shows clearly that the entry into force of the 
Barcelona Agreement has only slightly intensified the benefits for the MPCs. A poten-   2010, Vol 11, ￿o 2  57 
     
Table 1. Value of Preference Margins resulting from the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements in ’000 US $ (1999)
1 
of which  Commodity \ Country 
(HS 1996)  Morocco  Turkey 
rest of Mediter-
ranean Partner 
Countries  Algeria  Egypt  Israel  Jordan  Lebanon  Libya  Syria  Tunisia 
0201  Meat of bovine animals  n.a
2  0.00  0.00  n.a  n.a  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
0203  Meat of swine  n.a  n.a  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
0207  Meat of the poultry  8.03  0.00  522.16  n.a  n.a  522.16  n.a  n.a  n.a  0.00  n.a 
0401  Milk and cream, not concen-
trated 
0.00  0.00  0.00  n.a  n.a  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
0402  Milk and cream, concentrated  n.a  0.00  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00  n.a  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00 
0702  Tomatoes  0.00  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00  0.00  0.00 
080510 Oranges  33168.58  0.00  16250.72  n.a  1135.16  10017.52  n.a  0.00  n.a  0.00  5098.04 
080810 Apples  380.96  0.00  1.69  0.11  0.27  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  0.92  0.38 
1001  Wheat and meslin  n.a  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
1003  Barley  n.a  n.a  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
1005  Maize (corn)  0.00  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  0.00 
1006  Rice  n.a  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  n.a  n.a 
1007  Grain sorghum  n.a  n.a  0.00  n.a  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  0.00 
1008  Other cereals  0.00  0.00  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  0.00 
1201  Soya beans  n.a  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
1204  Linseed  n.a  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
1206  Sunflower seeds  0.00  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
1207  Other oil seeds  0.00  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00  n.a 
1507  Soya-bean oil  65.85  n.a  0.93  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  0.93  n.a  n.a  n.a 
1509  Olive oil  0.00  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00  n.a  0.00  0.00 
1512  Sunflower-seed, safflower or 
cotton-seed oil 
n.a  0.00  0.00  n.a  n.a  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
2401  Unmanufactured tobacco  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  0.00  n.a  0.00  0.00 
5201  Cotton not carded or combed  0.00  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  0.00  0.00 
170111 Cane sugar  n.a  n.a  0.00  n.a  n.a  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
  Sum  33623.42  0.00  16775.50  0.11  1135.43  10539.68  0.00  0.93  0.00  0.92  5098.42 
1 for the period 1998-2003 import duties (into the EU) where reported only for 1999 and 2003, whereas for Libya only for 1999; 
2  n.a= non-available import duty for 
this commodity; Source: own calculations based on reported import duties derived from TRAINS and bilateral trade flows derived from COMTRADE 58  AGRICULTURAL ECO￿OMICS REVIEW 
 
Table 2. Value of Preference Margins resulting from the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements in ’000 US $ (2003)
1 
of which  Commodity \ Country  
(HS 1996)  Morocco  Turkey 
rest of Mediter-
ranean Partner 
Countries  Algeria  Egypt  Israel  Jordan  Lebanon  Libya  Syria  Tunisia 
0201  Meat of bovine animals  n.a
2  n.a  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  0.00  n.a 
0203  Meat of swine  0.00  n.a  0.00  n.a  n.a  0.00  n.a  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a 
0207  Meat of the poultry  n.a  111.79  0.00  n.a  n.a  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
0401  Milk and cream, not concen-
trated 
n.a  0.00  0.00  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
0402  Milk and cream, concentrated  n.a  0.00  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
0702  Tomatoes  58370.40  19387.20  2447.66  1.36  444.09  0.00  316.72  3.11  n.a  0.00  1682.38 
080510 Oranges  48831.55  5780.60  30046.55  n.a  4725.44  18548.43  n.a  36.15  n.a  n.a  6736.53 
080810 Apples  -0.03  343.39  -0.03  n.a  -0.02  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  -0.02  n.a 
1001  Wheat and meslin  n.a  133.26  0.87  n.a  n.a  0.00  n.a  0.87  n.a  0.00  n.a 
1003  Barley  n.a  0.00  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
1005  Maize (corn)  0.00  0.00  0.00  n.a  n.a  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
1006  Rice  n.a  687.73  0.00  n.a  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  0.00  0.00 
1007  Grain sorghum  n.a  n.a  0.00  n.a  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
1008  Other cereals  n.a  n.a  0.00  n.a  0.00  n.a  n.a  0.00  n.a  0.00  n.a 
1201  Soya beans  n.a  n.a  0.00  n.a  n.a  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
1204  Linseed  0.00  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
1206  Sunflower seeds  n.a  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  0.00  n.a 
1207  Other oil seeds  0.00  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00  n.a 
1507  Soya-bean oil  28.51  2.34  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
1509  Olive oil  0.00  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00  n.a  0.00  0.00 
1512  Sunflower-seed, safflower or 
cotton-seed oil 
33.98  3.29  8.29  n.a  8.29  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
2401  Unmanufactured tobacco  n.a  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00  n.a  n.a  0.00  n.a  0.00  0.00 
5201  Cotton not carded or combed  0.00  0.00  0.00  n.a  0.00  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  0.00  0.00 
170111 Cane sugar  n.a  0.00  0.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
  Sum  107264.41  26449.60  32503.34  1.36  5177.80  18548.43  316.72  40.13  0.00  -0.02  8418.91 
1 for the period 1998-2003 import duties (into the EU) where reported only for 1999 and 2003, whereas for Libya only for 1999; 
2  n.a= non-available import duty for 
this commodity; Source: own calculations based on reported import duties derived from TRAINS and bilateral trade flows derived from COMTRADE    2010, Vol 11, ￿o 2  59 
 
tial expansion of exports into the EU of those commodities where the VPM is already 
positive would result to significant gains for the MPCs.  
  Moving towards multilateralism is connected to preference erosion effects for the 
MPCs. Francois et al. (2006) explain that preference erosion effects arise from the re-
duction or elimination of tariffs on the non-preferential supplier and show that prefer-
ence erosion is certainly beneficial for the third countries and not beneficial for the pref-
erential supplier, especially if this country is less efficient than third countries. The ef-
fects for the preferential importer are not clearly positive or negative and certainly the 
magnitude of the effects depends on the initial granted preferences. If this is the case, 
then the elimination of preferences could be beneficial for small developing countries 
that supply major markets of developed countries. This argument could be relevant for 
the MPCs, which are at the moment preferential suppliers of the EU markets. 
 
 
Existing empirical assessments 
  A number of ex-ante empirical studies analyse the impacts of future trade liberalisa-
tion between the EU and the non-EU Mediterranean countries. Table 3 gives an over-
view of relevant studies and their scope. Most of them are carried out with Computable 
General  Equilibrium  models  (CGE)  focusing  only  on  one  country,  usually  Turkey, 
Egypt,  Tunisia  or  Morocco.  A  number  of  studies  employing  multi-regional,  multi-
commodity models use the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) without modifying 
the model structure and the model closure or alternatively use the database of various 
GTAP versions. A few studies have been carried out with dynamic CGEs, while even 
fewer are the studies that analyse the impacts of trade liberalisation on the Mediterra-
nean agricultural sector with partial equilibrium (PE) models. 
  The scenarios are related to tariff cuts between the examined Mediterranean coun-
try(ies) and the EU. Because the opening of the EU markets to the MPCs under the 
Euro-Med Agreements is a step-wise procedure, almost all the studies simulate scenar-
ios that examine various extends of tariff reduction (usually 50 and 100 %). This is the 
case  for  example  of  Augier  and  Gasiorek  (2003),  Harrison  et  al.  (1997),  Hoekman 
(2001), Hosoe (2001), Rutherford et al. (1997) and of the studies using dynamic CGE 
models, whereas the liberalisation was either unilateral (from the side of the MPCs) or 
bilateral. Kuiper (2006) followed a different schema i.e. formulated first a base assump-
tion, where the policy variables are adjusted so as to approximate the policy framework 
in the year that the results refer to and then simulated a full bilateral liberalisation be-
tween the  examined MPCs and the EU, providing in this way the lower  and upper 
bounds of the forthcoming liberalisation. A similar scheme is followed by Britz et al. 
(2006). In most of the CGE models the liberalisation is set in manufactures and services 
and not in the agricultural commodities. Agricultural markets are examined thoroughly 
only by the PE models, while in the CGE studies they are presented aggregated usually 
in one sector. 
  The results focus mainly on the whole economy of the non-EU countries. The au-
thors generally agree that liberalisation will result in welfare gains for the EU, in in-
crease of its exports to non-EU Mediterranean countries and in higher producer prices in 
the MPCs. The magnitude of the effects varies based on the importance of the liberal-
ised sectors for the EU markets.  60  AGRICULTURAL ECO￿OMICS REVIEW 
 
  The existing studies give only narrow insights to the issue of preference erosion. In 
all studies apart from Kuiper (2006) and Britz et al. (2006) both the base year and the 
baseline scenario refer to a time period where the Euro-Med Agreements were not rati-
fied by the MPCs. Hence preferences granted to MPCs were not captured and conse-
quently trade liberalisation scenarios show trade creation and diversion effects that are 
not the result of preference erosion. Kuiper (2006) and Britz et al. (2006) discuss the 
effects from the view of the EU. 
 
Table 3.  Overview of ex-ante empirical studies on modelling agricultural trade policy 
liberalisation on the Mediterranean Basin with equilibrium models 
Type of 
model  Study  Scope of the study 
Computable General Equilibrium Models 
static  Augier and Gasiorek (2003) 
Brown et al. (1997) 
Chatti (2003) 
Harrison et al. (1997) 
Hoekman (2001) 
Konan and Maskus (1997; 2000) 
Minot et al. (2007) 
Ravallion and Lokshin (2004) 
Rutherford et al. (1997) 
Euro-Med Agreements 
EU-Tunisia free trade area 
EU-Tunisia free trade area 
EU-Turkey customs union 
Egypt’s trade liberalisation 
Egypt’s trade liberalisation + fiscal policies 
Tunisia’s and Syria’s trade liberalisation  
Moroccan trade liberalisation 
EU-Morocco free trade area 
- GTAP  Alessandri (2000) 
Dennis (2006) 
Diao and Yeldan (2001) 






EU-Morocco free trade area 
Jordan trade liberalisation  
Euro-Med Agreements on Morocco and Tunisia 
dynamic  Chemingui and Dessus (2001) 
Feraboli et al. (2003) 
Löfgren et al. (2001) 
EU-Tunisia trade liberalisation 
EU-Jordan trade liberalisation 
Moroccan trade liberalisation 
Partial Equilibrium Models 
static  Britz et al. (2006) 
Grethe (2003)] 
Euro-Med trade liberalisation 
EU-Turkey customs union 
spatial  M´Barek (2002)  Euro-Med Agreements on Morocco and Tunisia 
Source: own compilation 
 
Overview of the trade model AGRISIM 
  The empirical analysis has been undertaken using the partial equilibrium multi com-
modity, multi region world trade model AGRISIM. It is a synthetic simulation model, 
comparative static and deterministic in nature, with non-linear, iso-elastic demand and 
supply functions. The regions are connected with each other with a market clearing 
mechanism, whereas the world market price that yields from this mechanism is fed into 
the domestic markets through the domestic prices. The net trade summed from all re-
gions, which is given by the difference between supply and demand, is fed again to the   2010, Vol 11, ￿o 2  61 
 
world market clearing mechanism, while the commodities are treated as homogenous. 
Policy interventions are considered as changes in nominal protection rates, price trans-
mission  elasticities,  minimum  producer  prices,  production  quotas  and  subsidies. 
Through shift coefficients in the demand and supply functions, additional variables can 
be simulated, like population and income growth (for more details see Pustovit, 2003).  
  Time series data of volumes of production, commodity balances and population dat-
ing from 1975 to 2001 are derived from FAOSTAT, whereas time series from 1986 to 
2001 containing information on trade policies are taken from the PSE and CSE database 
of the OECD. For countries and/or commodities not included in the PSE databases other 
sources are used. Ad-valorem applied tariffs are derived from TRAINS. From the same 
source are taken – when existing – specific tariffs, compound tariffs, mixed tariffs and 
technical tariffs that are first converted to ad-valorem equivalents and then fed into the 
model, whereas export subsidies from 1995 to 2001 are taken from the WTO secretariat. 
The elasticities were taken from SWOPSIM and regarding the Central and East Euro-
pean Countries from the CEEC-ASIM model developed at IAMO. After the recent up-
dates and extensions of the model additionally have been used the databases of FAPRI 
and the USDA. The supply elasticities (own and cross price) for oranges, apples and 
tomatoes for the Mediterranean Countries are taken from Grethe (2003) and M´Barek 
(2002). 
  For the simulations a 17-region, 15-commodities aggregation scheme has been fol-
lowed. Table 4 shows the regional aggregation and the commodity composition.  
 
Table 4.  Aggregation scheme of the AGRISIM Database for the simulations 
Regions  Products 
GRE   Greece   APPL  Apples 
ITA   Italy   ORAN Oranges 
ESP   Spain   TOMA Tomatoes 
E12  Rest of EU-15  OLIO  Olive Oil 
MOR  Morocco  COTT  Cotton Lint 
TUR  Turkey  TOBA  Tobacco 
MPC  Rest of MPC  WHEA Wheat 
CEC  New Member States of the EU (Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) 
COAR  Coarse grains (barley, maize, 
triticale, oats, rye, sorghum, 
other cereals) 
BUR  Bulgaria and Romania  RICE  Rice 
RUA  Russia and Ukraine  SUGA  Sugar 
ANZ  Australia and New Zealand  OILS  Oilseeds 
MEX  Mexico  MILK  Milk 
USA  United States  BEEF  Beef and Veal 
BRA  Brazil  PORK  Pig meat 
CHI  China  POUL  Poultry meat 
ROE  Canada, Iceland, Japan, Norway, South Korea, 
Switzerland 
   
ROW  Rest of World     
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  Because base year of the model is 2001 and in order to capture preference erosion 
effects, a baseline scenario (BA) was necessary, where the EU agricultural policy pa-
rameters are adjusted based on the recent CAP reforms since changes in the domestic 
policy of the EU are reflected in the extra-EU trade with its partner countries. In detail, 
in this scenario the reforms under Agenda 2000 for the years 2002 and 2003 are in-
cluded by decreasing the direct payments for oilseeds and by increasing those for beef. 
Additionally the EU east enlargement, the Luxembourg Agreement and the reform of 
the CAP for the Mediterranean commodities of 2004 (cotton, olive oil and tobacco) are 
simulated.  For  the  Luxembourg  Agreement  the  option of  full  decoupling  is  chosen, 
while the direct subsidies for the tobacco market are fully decoupled and reduced by 
50 %, for cotton they are decoupled by 65 % and for olive oil by 60 %. The reform of 
the sugar sector in the EU, which followed in 2006, and the reform of the tomato market 
(in 2007) have not been taken into account.  
  In the first scenario (SC1), the forthcoming FTA with the EU is supposed to be fully 
implemented. It is assumed that the price level within the MPCs is adjusted to the EU 
one, since the EU is a large country when compared to the MPCs. This is modelled by 
setting the Nominal Protection’s Rate (NPR) of the MPCs at the level of the EU one. In 
a second scenario (SC2) a full multilateral liberalisation has been simulated.  
By comparing the results of SC2 with the baseline scenario and with SC1 the lower 
and upper limits of possible preference erosion effects are revealed for the MPCs, which 




Commodity balances and net trade effects 
  Generally a decline of the supply and small adjustments of the demand are observed. 
Table 5 and 6 present in detail the simulation results. 
  In detail, in Morocco deviations of SC2 from BA reveal a decrease of the cereals 
supply by about 4%, decline of the milk production by about 14% and decrease of the 
olive oil production by about 10%. The highest reduction is for poultry meat and apples, 
where the production is reduced by about 38% and 26% respectively. On the contrary, 
the supply of tomatoes, oranges and cotton increases by about 7%, 5% and 10% respec-
tively. The deviations of SC2 from SC1 are milder and of the same direction. Only for 
cereals an increase of the production by about 4 percentage points is observed.  
  In Turkey the results are of a small magnitude. When comparing the results of SC2 
with the baseline scenario, then the highest reduction is observed for beef (about 14%). 
For Mediterranean commodities there is a slight increase of the supply of tomatoes and 
of oranges by about 7% each, while the olive oil supply declines by about 5%. The up-
per bounds (deviation of SC2 from SC1) are higher regarding beef and milk supply (de-
crease of supply by about 20% in each market).  
  In the rest of MPCs the deviations of SC2 from the BA are high for supply of toma-
toes, olive oil and milk (decrease of 39%, 11% and 8% respectively). Again the devia-
tions of SC2 from SC1 are milder apart from beef and milk, where the decline of the 
supply is as in Turkey (about -20% in each market). 
  The  adjustments  on  the  demand  are  also  smooth.  The  highest  deviations  of  SC2 
compared to BA are observed in the Moroccan apple market (increase of 19%), the   2010, Vol 11, ￿o 2  63 
 
Turkish  
Table 5.  Simulation results: changes from BA in % 
Supply  Demand  Farm gate prices  Border prices  Commo-
dity  MOR  TUR  MPC  MOR  TUR  MPC  MOR  TUR  MPC  MOR  TUR  MPC 
WHEA  -4  1  -3  5  -1  2  -25  3  -9  -3  -4  -3 
COAR  -7  -6  3  0  7  0  -1  -17  -1  -1  -1  -1 
RICE  -10  1  1  5  -1  0  -52  8  4  2  8  4 
OILS  0  -3  0  0  2  -1  0  -19  1  0  1  1 
SUGA  1  -1  2  -1  1  -2  9  -11  27  9  14  29 
MILK  -14  3  -8  0  0  6  -51  1  -16  5  16  5 
BEEF  5  -14  1  -4  24  -3  16  -52  7  16  45  15 
PORK  3  0  2  -2  0  -2  11  6  8  11  6  10 
POUL  -38  -4  -6  0  -5  0  -49  -12  -14  7  5  3 
COTT  10  1  2  0  -1  -1  0  4  2  2  4  2 
TOBA  -1  -1  0  1  1  0  -7  -9  4  9  14  8 
OLIO  -11  -5  -11  6  3  5  -33  -20  -28  4  6  4 
APPL  -26  5  -1  19  -3  1  -31  6  -2  6  6  5 
ORA7  7  7  2  -4  -3  -1  8  8  2  8  8  9 
TOMA  5  8  -39  -1  -2  13  3  4  -25  3  4  3 
Source: own calculations with AGRISIM 
 
Table 6.  Simualation results: changes from SC1 in % 
Supply  Demand  Farm gate prices  Border prices  Commo-
dity  MOR  TUR  MPC  MOR  TUR  MPC  MOR  TUR  MPC  MOR  TUR  MPC 
WHEA  3  -1  0  1  1  -2  -4  -7  -5  -3  -4  -4 
COAR  4  6  4  2  3  3  -9  -8  -9  -1  -1  -2 
RICE  -4  -4  -5  2  2  2  -18  -32  -36  2  8  4 
OILS  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0 
SUGA  -5  -4  -3  5  4  3  -66  -48  -44  9  14  30 
MILK  -9  -22  -21  0  5  12  -25  -36  -43  5  17  6 
BEEF  -17  -10  -19  20  18  19  -145  -36  -135  17  47  16 
PORK  -3  0  -2  2  0  2  -12  -16  -13  11  7  10 
POUL  -15  -15  -15  0  -10  -2  -20  -36  -38  7  6  4 
COTT  3  2  2  -1  -1  -1  2  4  2  2  4  2 
TOBA  1  1  1  -1  -1  -1  7  11  7  9  14  7 
OLIO  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
APPL  0  0  -1  0  0  1  0  0  -2  6  6  5 
ORA7  -4  -4  -4  2  2  2  -6  -5  -5  9  9  10 
TOMA  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0 64  AGRICULTURAL ECO￿OMICS REVIEW 
 
Source: own calculations with AGRISIM 
beef market (increase of 24%) and the tomato market in the rest of MPCs (increase of 
demand by about 13%). For the rest of the markets the demand effects are very small. 
Deviations of SC2 from SC1 are evident in the beef market. In all MPCs the demand of 
beef increases by about 20% (instead of decrease by about 4%). Contrasting are also the 
effects on the Moroccan apple market, where the demand remains in the level of SC1. 
  Figure 1 illustrates of the net trade effects on selected markets. Generally due to lib-
eralisation the MPCs increase slightly the imports of commodities where they are al-
ready net importers and at the same they are able to increase slightly the exports of 
Mediterranean commodities, as for example oranges or tomatoes. Deviations between 














BA SC1 SC2 BA SC1 SC2 BA SC1 SC2







WHEA MILK BEEF OLIO ORAN TOMA
 
1 Positive values in the axis Y refer to net exports, while negative values to net imports 
Source: own compilation based on AGRISIM simulations 




  A striking exception to this general trend is this of the tomato market in the rest of 
MPCs. Not only is a reduction of the exports revealed but also a change of the trade 
status. From net exporter of about 0.14 million t the region becomes into net importer of 
about 4.5 million t due to a full liberalisation (SC2). For olive oil, the development of 
the trade balance is not in favour of the MPCs, although the deviations are quite small. 
The exports due to liberalisation (SC2) are decreased by about 9,000 t in Turkey and by 
about 66,000 t in the rest of MPCs. In Morocco the net trade status changes and due to 
full multilateral liberalisation and from net exporter of 2,000 t the country becomes into 
net importer of 8,000 t. Further changes of the trade status are observed in Turkey, 
where the net trade status of the beef market changes and from net export of almost   2010, Vol 11, ￿o 2  65 
 
1,000 t Turkey becomes into net importer of about 122,000 t in SC2. 
Prices 
  The changes of the NPR (Table 7) are the driving force for price adjustments. The 
effects vary between the single markets and the countries-regions because of the differ-
ent initial protection. The deviations of SC2 both from the baseline scenario and from 
SC1 are the same for those markets that are either completely liberalised in the EU or 
where the EU’s protection is very low and they differ for highly protective markets 
within the EU such as sugar, milk and meat products. For those markets lower and up-
per bounds are formed, which vary from country to country depending on the initial rate 
of protection. 
 
Table 7.  Net protection’s rate in the MPCs markets, in % 
Morocco  Turkey  Rest of MPCs  Commo-
dity  Base Year  SC1  SC2  Base Year  SC1  SC2  Base Year  SC1  SC2 
WHEA  29  2  0  -7  2  0  7  2  0 
COAR  0  8  0  19  8  0  0  8  0 
RICE  111  40  0  0  40  0  0  40  0 
OILS  0  0  0  25  0  0  0  0  0 
SUGA  0  75  0  27  75  0  2  75  0 
MILK  115  60  0  16  60  0  26  60  0 
BEEF  0  164  0  207  164  0  8  164  0 
PORK  0  23  0  0  23  0  2  23  0 
POUL  109  49  0  19  49  0  20  49  0 
COTT  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
TOBA  18  0  0  25  0  0  4  0  0 
OLIO  55  0  0  31  0  0  43  0  0 
APPL  55  7  0  0  7  0  7  7  0 
ORA7  0  15  0  0  15  0  7  15  0 
TOMA  0  0  0  0  0  0  37  0  0 
Source: own calculations with AGRISIM 
 
  In detail, multilateral liberalisation results in Morocco in increase of the beef farm 
gate prices of about 16 percentage points when compared to BA and decrease of about 
145% when compared to SC1. In the rest of MPCs the respective deviations are about 
+7% and to -135%, while in Turkey -52% and -36%, as the Turkish beef market is 
highly protected. For the sugar market, SC2 compared to BA leads to an increase of the 
farm gate prices of about 9% and 27% in Morocco and the rest of MPCs respectively 
and a decrease of about 11% in Turkey. SC2 compared to SC1 results in a decrease of 
the sugar farm gate prices of about 66% in Morocco, 48% in Turkey and 44% in the rest 
of MPCs. Liberalisation without the assumptions of SC1 (deviation from BA) results in 
decrease of 33%, 20% and 28% of the olive oil farm gate prices in Morocco, Turkey 
and the rest of MPCs respectively. If the FTA with the EU is fully into force, then no 
further decrease of the farm gate prices should be expected. 
  The adjustments of the border prices are of lower magnitude than those of the farm 66  AGRICULTURAL ECO￿OMICS REVIEW 
 
gate prices. The effects are of the same magnitude when looking the deviations of SC2 
both from BA and from SC1. Overall the border prices increase being the highest for 
livestock commodities and mainly beef meat and for sugar.  
  The changes of the farmers’ income are analogous to the changes of the farm gate 
prices and the supply. General conclusions on the development of the income are diffi-
cult to be made because the effects on the single markets vary between the MPCs.  
  Of interest for the producers of the MPCs are certainly the developments on the mar-
kets of olive oil, oranges and tomatoes, where they are mostly specialised. When com-
pared to BA, the income of tomato and orange farmers due to liberalisation increases by 
about 8% and 15% in Morocco and in Turkey respectively. In the rest of MPCs the in-
come of the orange farmers increases by 4% and this of tomato farmers decreases by 
merely 55%. The olive oil farmers will suffer a decrease of their income by about 40%, 
25% and 35% in Morocco, Turkey and the rest of MPCs respectively.  
  When compared to SC1, the effects of liberalisation are much lower. They seem to 
be effective only for the orange producers who will see a decrease of their income by 
about 10 percentage points respectively.  
  For the rest of the commodities, high income deviations of SC2 from BA are ob-
served in Morocco regarding the income of milk producers (reduction of about 58%) 
and of poultry meat producers (reduction of about 68%) and in Turkey regarding the 
income of beef producers (-59%).  
  On the other side, the deviations of SC2 from SC1 will affect the most the beef pro-
ducers in Morocco and in the rest of MPCs (decrease of about 200% and 180% respec-
tively), of sugar farmers throughout the MPCs (-50%, -53% and -74% in rest of MPCs, 
Turkey and Morocco respectively) and of milk producers again throughout the MPCs 
(decrease of about 30%, 65% and 67% in Morocco, rest of MPCs and Turkey respec-
tively). 
 
Budgetary, Allocative and Welfare effects 
  The budget effects are attributed to changes of the customs duties which result from 
changes in the net traded quantities and the prices as already discussed.  
  Opening of the trade, results in decrease of the revenue from the import tariffs but 
also to lower expenditure for export subsidies. This is the reason why the overall change 
of budget is negative in Morocco and positive in Turkey when compared to the BA. In 
the rest of MPCs the deviations of the budget effects from the baseline scenario are at-
tributed to changes of the customs duties for tomatoes which are in turn due to changes 
of the net trade status. 
  The distribution of the resources is favour of the consumers, shown in detail in Table 
8. When the preferential scheme between the EU and the MPCs is partial (deviations of 
liberalisation scenario from BA), then the consumer surplus increases by about US$1, 
US$0.5 and US$3 billion in Morocco, in Turkey and in the rest of MPCs respectively. 
On the other side the producers are worse off and the producer surplus decreases by 
about US$0.8, US$0.3 and US$2.6 billion in the three regions respectively.  
  The effects are more profound when the preferences between the EU and the MPCs 
are the deepest (deviation of SC2 from SC1) and this because the EU still maintains 
high protection for particular markets as the NPR reveals.  
  The positive welfare effects imply that preference erosion effects are beneficial for   2010, Vol 11, ￿o 2  67 
 
the MPCs and can be explained by the fact that the MPCs are low cost suppliers to the  
Table 8.  Allocative and welfare effects on the MPCs (US$ million) 













Producer surplus  -859  -981  -387  -1719  -2625  -7620 
Quota owner surplus  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Consumer surplus  1028  1000  552  1554  3024  8500 
Budget  -162  63  37  429  -329  3 
total  7  82  202  264  69  883 
Source: own calculations with AGRISIM 
 
 





  Preference erosion effects are already an updated concern for many developing coun-
tries that enjoy preferences granted by developed countries within the ongoing discus-
sions on multilateralism. In this paper preference erosion effects that arise for the EU’s 
preferred Mediterranean Partner Countries have been examined with the help of the par-
tial equilibrium model AGRISIM with a numerical modelling of complete multilateral 
liberalisation. Lower and upper bounds of preference erosion effects have been revealed 
by comparing the simulation results low and deep level of preferences respectively. 
  The results indicate that with low integration, liberalisation leads to losses for the 
producers in terms of reduced farm gate prices and level of supply which are particu-
larly distinguishable for highly protective markets. The preference erosion effects that 
will follow when the preferences between the EU and the MPCs are deep (i.e. when a 
free trade area exists between the EU and the MPCs) are of lower magnitude and there 
the reduction of the supply and of the farm gate prices is mostly on livestock commodi-
ties and sugar. Driving force for the changes is the high NPR within the EU and thus the 
high price level in the union between the EU and the MPCs. 
  The overall welfare effects are positive revealing that the producers could be com-
pensated by a better allocation’s policy. It can be thus concluded that preference erosion 
effects are positive since multilateral liberalisation of the agricultural sector does not 
affect negative the MPCs. On the contrary liberalisation is the policy that the MPCs 
should look for. 
  Openness to trade is alone not a sufficient condition to provide gains from trade. 
Other factors could play an important role as well, that have not been considered in this 
paper, as for example geographical variables or institutional quality. Certainly it would 
be interesting to examine whether institutional reforms are needed in the MPCs so as to 
support  an  efficient  market  structure  and  a  well  functioning  allocation  of  resources 
among the producers and the consumers within each country. 
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